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Abstract: Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) is a model that analyses real market proc-
esses with the help of time pattern analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently 
(See www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/cfd). The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of 
cartels via characteristic market process patterns. This is based on the assumption that 
existing cartels cause failures in the observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit 
attempts to draw conclusions from these process patterns in order to find hidden cartels and 
to engage antitrust agencies into additional more detailed audits.  
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1.  Introduction 
Most of the detected cartels are found through displeased employees, discriminated customers 
or a cartel member benefiting from a leniency program. In order to detect cartel structures an 
instrument is missing that is able to screen markets using economic criteria (Porter, 2004). 
The CFD cartel-audit is such a tool that should enable the detection of cartels via characteris-
tic market process patterns. This is based on the assumption that existing cartels cause failures 
in the observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from 
these process patterns in order to find hidden cartels and to engage antitrust agencies into 
additional more detailed audits.  
Chapter 2 summarises the fundamentals of the coordination failure diagnostics concept. Chap-
ter 3 figures collusive markers for a market screening and the procedure in the CFD cartel-
audit. Chapter 4 applies the method to the German cement cartel and chapter 5 gives conclud-
ing remarks.  
2.  The model: Coordination Failure Diagnostics 
Standard economic theory assumes that after exogenous shocks markets move fast and reli-
able to equilibrium. In contrast the New Austrian School expect markets not necessarily to 
find a new equilibrium without frictions. Hence, empirical testing is necessary for both hy-
potheses (Grossekettler, 2001).  
In the general equilibrium theory the Walrasian auctioneer matches supply and demand in a 
market of perfect competition with perfect information and no transaction costs. This process 
is called tâtonnement related to the finding of the market clearing price (Arrow and Debreu, 
1954). But in most markets there is neither an auctioneer nor demand and supply curves are 
observable. Therefore it is impossible to verify whether prices and quantities represent an 
equilibrium. The CFD does not try to estimate demand and supply curves, but detects disequi-
libria on the basis of circumstances that indicate welfare losses. The CFD model uses five 
market processes as control loop mechanisms in a cybernetic sense, where shocks affect the 
adjusted variable (e.g. the difference quantity between demand and supply) and the control 
variable (e.g. the price) regulates the adjusted variable back to equilibrium. The equilibrium 
of the adjusted variables is zero, because all other values are defects and cause welfare losses.  
The microeconomic market processes in CFD are the following of which each has a different 
adjusted variable. The Market Clearing Process should provoke a tendency of adjustment 
between demand and supply to prevent waste of production factors in form of nonsaleable 
goods or delays of delivery. The adjusted variable is the difference quantity between demand   3
and supply. The Rate-of-Return Normalisation Process aims at the efficient allocation of 
production factors which are guided towards their best economic use. This is reached by 
variations in capacities in order to achieve a rate of return equalisation according to the sec-
ond of Gossen’s Law and an efficient primary distribution of income. The adjusted variable is 
the difference between the market rate of return and the rate of return of a broader industry 
class. A working Erosion of Market Power Process prevents market participants from gain-
ing enduring dominant positions of market power by ensuring that structural variations dimin-
ish predominant positions. Concentration indices serve as adjusted variables. The Product 
Innovation Process aims at the interest of consumers by ensuring that domestic producers 
remain competitive, so that they do not lag behind world-quality leaders in the long-run. The 
market share of new or quality improved products acts as adjusted variable. The Technology 
Innovation Process’ main goal is to ensure that domestic producers in the long-run do not lag 
behind world-cost leaders. The adjusted variable here is the labor productivity. Empirical 
analyses show that these five market processes usually do function, because the adjusted 
variables oscillate around the zero-line (Grossekettler, 1999, 137).  
3.  Collusive markers and the CFD cartel-audit 
Cartels affect the five mentioned market processes in a special manner which can be observed 
by the CFD cartel auditing method. This chapter shows typical characteristics of collusive 
behavior which serve as collusive markers in a market screening. If these indicators point at 
coordination failures in the analysed market this could be an advice for cartel structures.  
Table 1: Collusive markers in the CFD cartel-audit 
Process Indicator  Characteristics 
nominal price 
 
seldom and high volatile changes of price-index 
fixed prices in cyclical downturns 
Market Clearing 
Process 
capacity utilization  small capacity utilization 
permanent excess supply 
rate of return 
 
oligopolistic excess rate of return, reduced by  
excess capacities or by fixed prices in recessions (under fixed costs)  
Rate-of-Return 
Normalisation 
Process  dysfunctional 
growths of capacities 
excess capacities independent of rate of return  
reduction of capacities only by acquisition 
HHI, equivalence 
index number 




Process  volatility of market 
shares 
small volatility of market shares, especially by fixed quotas 
Product Innova-
tion Process 
market share of new 
products 
obvious innovation lags 
Technology 
Innovation Pr. 
labor productivity  innovation success hindered by less effective firms 
little incentives for productivity gains without competition 
   4
Due to different cost structures of cartel members it is difficult for them to agree upon one 
price. The nominal price is usually varied seldom and in high volatility, because cartel mem-
bers change prices at the same time and at the same ratio so that no one is suspicious to devia-
tion (see Abrantes-Metz et al., 2005). Cartel suppliers act as quantity takers under fixed prices 
until the cartel assigns capacities by quotas. But the members hold reserve capacities to get 
higher quotas and to be armed for a possible break up of the cartel. This behaviour leads to 
little capacity utilization and permanent excess capacities. In a successful collusion all mem-
bers benefit from excess rate-of-return through oligopolistic pricing, but this value could be 
reduced by the costs of the excess capacities or by fixed prices during a fall in demand under 
constant fixed costs. The capacities grow independent from the rate of return and reductions 
of capacity function only through acquisition or sale from another member. As concentration 
ratio operates the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index which involves all firms in the market n 




i i HHI p
= =∑ . The less the number of suppliers in a 
market, the easier it is to establish collusion (Ivaldi et.al., 2003, 12ff). That is the reason why 
most cartels are found in oligopolistic markets with less than 10 relevant players (Carlton; 
Perloff, 1994, 187) and an equivalence index number of  *1 0 n ≤ . The equivalence index 
number is the reciprocal of the HHI (corrected with entry barriers and legal cooperating firms) 
under the assumption that firms have the same size. Market shares of cartel members are fixed 
so that their volatility is rather small. Market shares are not published in official statistics, but 
they could be measured with a new indicator – the market share volatility. This value meas-
ures the annual volatility of market shares of every firm over time and aggregates them to an 
index number for the whole industry. Thus sensible firm data can be used without revealing 
details of one firm, which is prohibited by german law authorities. The Technology Innova-
tion Process and especially the Product Innovation Process are characterized by little incen-
tives for productivity gains due to lack of competition. Therefore the market shares of new 
products and usually the labor productivity stay low in cartelized markets.  
The CFD cartel-audit verifies the collusive markers systematically in two steps. Step 1 checks 
excess capacities, especially a low capacity utilisation, and the equivalence index number. If 
step 1 finds an equivalence index number smaller 10 and an existing excess capacity, these 
indicators suggest the existence of cartel structures. If both indicators are located in the re-
searched market, the procedure continues with (the using more complex data) step 2. Figure 1 
shows the procedure of the CFD cartel-audit, where step 1 checks the indicators with little 
data needs and if necessary step 2 checks the other more data intensive indicators.    5
Figure 1: Workflow of the CFD cartel-audit 
Start
Step 1 (short screen)
excess capacity?
equivalence index number <10?
yes
Step 2 (data intensive screen)
seldom and high volatile changes of nominal price-index?
dysfunctional growths of capacities?
low value of market share volatility?
innovation lags caused by lack of competition?
yes
Apply most of the indicators to the researched market, the competition 
authorities should use their specific analysis methods.
 
 
The analysis in step 2 includes the other above mentioned indicators, which can operate as a 
collusive marker. It is tested whether the nominal prices change seldom and with high volatil-
ity. Is the rate of return normal, not because of lower prices, but because of the costs of excess 
capacities? Another indicator is the small fluctuation of the market share volatility. In the 
Technology and especially in the Product Innovation Process exist innovation lags as a result 
of lack of competition. Do most of the indicators apply to the researched market, the competi-
tion authorities should be informed and use their specific analysis methods looking for cartel-
ized structures. 
4.  CFD cartel-audit in the German cement market 
The in chapter 3 established indicators will now be applied to the German cement market, 
where an illegal cartel existed for decades. It should be tested, whether the CFD cartel-audit 
would have discovered the cartel.   
The German cement producers have often been convicted for illegal agreements on prices or 
quotas in the markets Southern Germany (1988), Europe (1994) and Germany (2002). The 
cement demanding construction industry complained about the absence of price decreases   6
despite the well known excess capacities. Cartel members were the biggest German producers 
like Heidelberg, Schwenk, Dyckerhoff, Lafarge, Alsen (later Holcim), Readymix and 6 small 
business firms, which were found guilty to pay fines of 661 million euros.  
The analysis starts with step 1of the workflow and tests existing excess capacities in the Mar-
ket Clearing Process and the equivalence index number in the Erosion of Market Power Proc-
ess.  
The Market Clearing Process measures the difference quantity between demand and supply. 
This adjusted variable can lead to excess demand or excess supply and should be regulated to 
zero through price changes. Control variable is the real price-index, which is established by 
deflation with the whole manufacturing industry. Additional the nominal price-index is given.  

























Source: Ifo Institute for Economic Research. 
The adjusted variable is aggregated by the capacity utilisation, the time for delivery and the 
stock of inventory, because the difference quantity has to be reflected at least in one of these 
values. The aggregated difference quantity can be calculated by data of the Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research with the formula: 
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with   7
D x = difference quantity of supply and demand 
t KAD = capacity utilisation in period t 
NKAD = normal capacity utilisation in the cement industry 
t LUS = stock of inventory in period t 
t BMD = time for delivery in period t 
NBMD = normal time for delivery in this industry. 
From the derived arguments for the German cement market results the above process pattern 
for 1978-2003. The process pattern often shows the tendency for the adjusted variable to 
move to zero, but there are also permanent phases of excess supply. Additionally a reaction 
test is conducted, which analyses, whether the adjusted variable and the control variable 
strongly react to each other to reduce the malfunction. A deviation of the adjusted variable 
from zero should evoke a reaction of the control variable, which brings the adjusted variable 
back to the equilibrium. The reaction test shows the coordination failure for the Market Clear-
ing Process, because the variations of the control variable as well as the variations of the 
adjusted variable show dysfunctional reactions. The number of dysfunctional reactions is very 
high with 52% and 48% (Lorenz, 2004).  
The process pattern shows from the beginning in the second quarter of 1983 a permanent 
excess supply for seven years. 1990 follows a period of predominant positive excess demand, 
which however often has a tendency to zero. In the third period from 1996 until 1998 the 
difference quantity crosses the zero line eight times. From 2000-2003 there is a permanent 
and increasing excess supply again.  
A permanent workability of the process can not be found here most of the time. Workability 
would be characterized by adjustments of the control variable in the right direction as reac-
tions of the movements of the adjusted variable. Until 1990 with an excess supply the price 
indices move in a relative constant corridor and do not fall. From 1978-1983 the cement 
market is characterised by typical movements for cartels; the prices move in stages, but rise at 
the beginning of the year and stay constant for the rest of the year. In the third period prices 
remain on a high level, even with a difference quantity around zero. In the last period prices 
rise for a short time in spite of growing excess supply and the crisis in the building industry, 
but fall sharply compared to the level of 1990.  
The cement producer determined their prices at a high level and adapted them sporadically. 
The slump took place after the detection of the cartel in 2002, when cement prices and capac-  8
ity utilisation dropped dramatically. At the same time Readymix started a price war in all four 
local markets in Germany (Blum, 2004).  
The Erosion of Market Power Process analyses the power between supply (cement produc-
ers) and demand (building material industry). Workability is given when coordination failures 
are removed through structural changes like new entry on the stronger side of the market, 
because the number of possible alternatives on the customers’ side rises.  
The best indicator to measure market power is the market share volatility, but the data is very 
difficult to obtain. The Federal Statistical Office published the data only for 2001-2003, which 
were 2,34%, 5,09% and 8,72% to the previous year. This means that since the cartel detection 
the volatility of market shares rose as a result of more competition (Lorenz, forthcoming).  
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Source: Federal Statistical Office. 
Because of the problems with the data the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index respectively the 
derived equivalence index number is used and corrected by factors like entry barriers and 
company cooperation etcetera. Legal cooperation is a very important factor which has to be 
measured and transformed into a concentration measure, because otherwise the concentration 
would be underestimated. It is conceived for the whole period by the estimations of the Ger-  9
man Monopoly Commission, which has measured the HHI for real existing groups of compa-
nies for the year 2001.  
The upper process pattern shows the high concentration in the market during the whole pe-
riod, because the measures of the HHI (with and without legal cooperation of the firms) lie 
above the barriers of an index of 100, which is normally used by the European Commission 
and the US Department of Justice (Kwoka; White, 2004, 18).  
Another concentration measure used here is the equivalence index number, which is generated 
through the reciprocal of the HHI. Under the assumption of companies with same market 
shares the equivalence index number shows the number of fictive companies in the market, 
with the same level of customer choice (i.e. the more suppliers are in the market, the greater is 
the flexibility to chance the vendor). The more the equivalence index number matches the real 
number of companies, the more uniformly distributed are the market shares and the less po-
tential has one company to reach a dominant position. In the cement market there exist about 
30 companies, but the computed number of fictive companies by the equivalence index num-
ber is below ten. This corresponds to the existing six big players in the market Dyckerhoff, 
Heidelberg, Lafarge, Holcim, Schwenk and Readymix, which dominate the bulk of the mar-
ket. So the equivalence index number shows a good estimation of the real concentration ratio, 
which is definitely characterised by high concentration.  
Step 1 shows excess supply and an equivalence index number smaller than ten, so that step 2 
of the workflow of the CFD cartel-audit has to be carried out (see Figure 1).  
It starts with the Rate-of-Return Normalisation Process, which analyses the rate of return in 
the cement market to the effect whether it follows a functional reaction of the growths of 
capacities. If there is excess rate of return, it should be adjusted by new entry or upgrades of 
existing capacities. The rate of return in the cement market and the rate of return of a higher 
industry class for a comparison are measured by data of the Federal Statistical Office by the 
following formula for the adjusted variable:  
net value added - gross income of dependent personal services 
STAB3 = 
total revenue .  
The perfect indicator for the control variable would be the capacity growth, which is deter-
mined only by the actual rate of return or their expected values (Nagel, 1998, 231 and 292ff). 
This indicator is not available. Hence, the growths of the furnace capacities published by the 
cement association have to be consulted. The number of furnaces and their specific produc-
tion capacity is published by the German cement association which represent the following 
process pattern.    10



























Source: Federal Statistical Office and German Cement Association. 
The rate of return of the cement industry starts 1980 and 1981 with negative values, which 
move fast into a corridor of 3-6% until 2001. After the German Unification 1991 the rate of 
return fell from 6 to 3 percent as a result of the additional East German capacities. The proc-
ess pattern shows that the rate of return normalisation process does not function, because the 
reactions of the control variable (the capacity growths) do not move in the right direction in 
68% of all reactions. During the rest of the period the capacities are reduced to a smaller 
extend, but this could be a sign of excess capacities in the cement industry. The adjusted 
variable (the difference in rate of return) does not function either, because it reacts in 55% of 
the process movements dysfunctional. There are light excess rate of returns in the cement 
industry which are not declining, because of additional capacities or emerging companies. 
Since the cartel detection in 2002 the rates of return fell dramatically. This means the compe-
tition profits are not high enough to keep this level of capacities constant and acquisitions or 
withdrawals are possible in near future.  
The Product Innovation Process uses the market share of new or quality improved products 
as adjusted variable. This indicator functions as a measure for innovation in relation to other 
cement industries in other countries. The Ifo Institute for Economic Research publishes data 
of the market shares of goods that are in the launch phase or in the first growths phase. Data 
of other countries are missing, so that a broader industry class is used for a comparison, the 
whole manufacturing industry.    11

















Source: Ifo Institute for Economic Research. 
The process pattern shows the market shares of new and quality improved products for the 
cement market as well as the whole manufacturing industry. Certainly the cement sector is not 
very dynamic, thus is mainly due to lack of competition, which dampens the incentives to 
better up one’s position through innovations. In the whole period there is an innovation ratio 
below average in the cement industry from 5% until nearly 40%. These values show a sus-
tainable function failure in the Product Innovation Process.  
Innovations in the Technology Innovation Process often occur through increases in produc-
tivity, where partial factor productivity is used as indicator (Sebbel-Leschke, 1996, 158f). An 
increase in capital intensity on the one hand leads to a decrease in capital productivity, but on 
the other hand to an increase in labor productivity. The labor productivity is defined as the 
quotient of output and the factor input, but it is important to acknowledge that labor is a very 
heterogeneous factor. Hours of work is a better indicator than number of employees, because 
reductions in working time would lead to an underestimation of the productivity, if just the 
figure is used. For a comparison between two states it is necessary to have the same units of 
output. The total revenue should not be used, because it does not include vertical integration 
in comparison to sourced out plant sections (OFT, 2004, 60). Since cement is a homogeneous 
good with little differences in quality the output can be measured in the quantity of tons, so 
that there is no need for a conversion into another currency. Indicator is the labor productivity 
derived by the division of cement in tons per really worked hours.  
The German cement market being analyzed should be compared to the worlds market leader 
in technology innovations, so the differences of the labor productivity of a pair of states is 
build and displayed in the following process pattern. In the view of industry experts like   12
business managers or engineers, possible benchmark states in the case of cement technologies 
are France and Italy.  
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Germany shows a positive difference of labor productivity compared to France and Italy for 
the whole period. The difference between France and Italy oscillates around zero, but with a 
small shortfall of France. For France compared to Italy the tendency is right, but not strong 
enough to reach the zero line. There are overhaul activities in technology innovations, but 
they are not enough to meet the international level.  
The general assumption that incentives for innovations on cartelized markets are smaller than 
in competitive markets does not hold. But the assumption is approved for product innovations, 
which are advantageous for the demand while technology improvements are also profitable 
for the producers. A high frequency in technology innovations on the German market is plau-
sible despite the existence of the cartel, because both the German and the French as well as 
the Italian cement groups are competitors in the world market. They build up new plants in 
the whole world with the highest technological levels and try to produce cement with the most 
efficient technologies.  
5.  Conclusions 
The analysis of the five market processes has indicated typical characteristics, which can be 
summarized as cartel syndrome and provide evidence for cartel structures. These characteris-
tics are as follows: seldom and high volatile changes of price-index, permanent excess supply, 
oligopolistic excess rate of return, dysfunctional growths of capacities, the equivalence index 
number shows an oligopoly and lags in product and technology innovations. Further research   13
activities will thus concentrate on identifying cartel-characteristic process pattern-syndromes, 
which can be utilised in form of collusive markers whilst screening for cartels. 
The example of the German cement market shows that the CFD cartel-audit is a systematic 
method to detect cartel activities by economic criteria. It fulfils the three criteria for a general 
market screening: First, evidence of collusion must be observable by just looking at easily 
available data. Second, the test to be conducted should be routinizable so that it can be carried 
out with minimum human input. The third criterion is that the screen should be costly for a 
cartel to delude by influencing the screening results. The objective is to screen industries as a 
matter of course, even where is not hint of collusion (Harrington, 2004, 41f). For this reason it 
can be recommended to the competition authorities to use a screening method like the CFD 
cartel-audit for the search for suspicious markets.  
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